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Augustin Berque 
[A geographer and orientalist, Augustin Berque (b. 1942) is retired professor at the 
Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris). He has published extensively 
on the relationship of human societies with their environment, especially in Japan. 
He advocates mesology (風土論 : the study of human milieux) as an onto-
geographical approach to human existence (see mésologiques.com). A member of 
the Academia europaea, he was in 2009 the first Westerner to receive the Fukuoka 
Grand Prize for Asian cultures. Contact: berque@ehess.fr] 
As noted in the acknowledgments, “this volume originated in a conference 
on ‘Understanding Nature in China and Europe until the Eighteenth Cen-
tury: A Cross-Cultural Project’, held in the city of Rheine in Westphalia, 
Germany, from March 22 to 25, 2000” (p. vii). It gathers together 17 articles 
by 15 authors, under the editorship of a sinologist (Hans Ulrich Vogel, 
University of Tübingen) and a philosopher and sociologist (Günter Dux, 
University of Freiburg), with a considerable help from another sinologist 
(Mark Elvin, Australian National University at Canberra), who contributes 
a substantial overview (pp. 1-55) and a synopsis of each contribution (pp. 
56-101). Thus, added to his own chapter (pp. 400-468), Elvin alone writes 
nearly one third of this huge collective work. 
The following themes are addressed in the book: “The Genesis of Philo-
sophy in the History of Mind: A Cross-Cultural Comparison between 
Classical Greece and China“ (Günter Dux); “The Universe as Cosmos: On 
the Ontology of the Greek World Image“ (Julián Pacho); “The Notion of 
Causality in Aristotle and the Medieval Philosophy of Nature: A Develop-
mental Approach“ (Ulrich Wenzel); “Cosmology and Concepts of Nature 
in Traditional China“ (John B. Henderson); “On Nature and Culture in 
Zhou China“ (Heiner Roetz); “Towards a Conceptual History of Some 
Concepts of Nature in Classical Chinese: zi ran 自然 and zi ran zhi li 自然之
理“ (Christoph Harbsmeier); “Mathematics, Nature and Cosmological In-
quiry in Traditional China“ (Karine Chemla); “When Shen Gua Encoun-
tered the ‘Natural World’: A Preliminary Discussion on the Mengxi bitan 
and the Concept of Nature“ (Fu Daiwie); “Becoming Acquainted with 
Nature from the Odes: Sidelights on the Study of Flora and Fauna in Song 
Dynasty’s Shijing 詩經 (Classic of Odes) Scholarship“ (Achim Mittag); 
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“Concepts of Nature in Traditional Chinese Materia Medica and Botany 
(Sixteenth to Seventeenth Century)“ (Georges Métailié); “The Investigation 
of Things (gewu 格物), Natural Studies (gezhixue 格致學), and Evidential 
Studies (kaozhengxue 考證學) in Late Imperial China (1600-1800)” (Benjamin 
A. Elman); “Personal Luck: Why Premodern China—probably—did not 
Develop Probabilistic Thinking“ (Mark Elvin); “’That Which Soaks and 
Descends Becomes Salty’: The Concept of Nature in Traditional Chinese 
Salt Production“ (Hans Ulrich Vogel); “The Myriad Things: Random 
Thoughts on Nature in China and the West“ (Wolfgang Kubin); “On the 
Relationship between Man and Nature in China“ (Helwig Schmidt-
Glintzer). 
Needless to say, discussing all of this variegated, and often extremely 
detailed material is beyond the scope of a single book review. I will concen-
trate, therefore, on some general ideas. First of all, let us render thanks to 
the three editors for having gathered and organized such rich reflexions on 
the cross-cultural analysis of the concept of nature. In the last quarter of a 
century or so, there have been many international conferences comparing 
the conceptions of nature (ziran guan 自然観) in the East and in the West, 
but seldom has the matter been explored so methodically. This work 
without doubt serves as a reference book on the question of nature in 
China (clearly more than in Europe), both for its texts and for the huge 
amount of bibliographical data concluding most of the chapters (e.g. 136 
titles in Vogel’s). 
Let us also thank Elvin for having written such a balanced synthesis of 
all that material, overcoming the inevitable discrepancies between nearly a 
score of different points of view on, and approaches to basically the same 
question, many of which are highly technical (especially Elvin’s own study 
on probability). This spares me the task of trying to do the same. I will 
rather discuss a few points, which to my mind are key.  
First of all, the choice of historical period, ending in the eighteenth 
century, is intended of course to limit the question to within a time frame 
when the European mode of relating to nature had not yet overwhelmed, 
in the form of the industrialized world, all the other modes, including 
traditional European ones. Before the industrial revolution, indeed, China 
and Europe might be compared more fairly, and, as is well known, this 
comparison might advantage China more often than the reverse. Accor-
dingly, for the sake of comparison, there are good reasons for having exclu-
ded the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet, what had been going on 
before 1800 is precisely that which explains what happened later. This is 
particularly the case for the scientific revolution, which took place in 
Europe in the seventeenth century, and without which—at least to my 
mind—the industrial revolution would not have been possible. 
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This is certainly a controversial point, one that the book does not delve 
into systematically enough. For sure, many of the articles give us precious 
clues about the lack of a really scientific (in the modern Western sense) 
approach to natural phenomena in China; this is, for example, clearly 
expressed by the very title of Vogel’s article. Yet, this does not amount to a 
direct discussion. On the whole, this lack of a direct appraisal of the 
scientific revolution reminds one of Kenneth Pomeranz’ The Great Diver-
gence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton 
University Press, 2000), the interpretation of which might easily lead one to 
think that, after all, the industrial revolution could be explained without 
the factor of modern science.  
As said above, I do not agree with this view. This is not only for the 
reason that what has become technoscience is nowadays inherent to 
industry, but rather because modern science and industry both stem from 
the same conception of nature as an object; and this is precisely the para-
digm which the scientific revolution definitely established. 
This exceeds the question of defining what the modern scientific 
method properly is; it rather becomes an ontological and logical problem, 
and in this respect, what is peculiar is the European historical path, not the 
Chinese one. What the Chinese knew about nature has a decisive trait in 
common with India, the Arab world, or Europe before the Galilean-
Newtonian paradigm: this knowledge did not leave aside human existence. 
This is expressed in the notion of cosmos, that is, a comprehensive order 
including both nature and the human. Of course, each culture expresses 
this common condition (viz cosmicity) in its proper terms. Much of the 
content of Concepts of Nature shows that, in various ways, the Chinese view 
of nature kept an analogical or correlative bent, reflecting the human onto 
the natural. Even though the systematic correlations between natural and 
social facts established by Dong Zhongshu during the Han dynasty may 
have been discussed later (resulting in a progressively more profane world-
view, as shown by several of the articles), physics never became indepen-
dent from political and moral considerations. Yet this is precisely what 
happened in modern Europe—at least in principle—, not elsewhere. 
The said principle is nothing other than dualism, which simultaneously 
absolutized the object (the res extensa) on the one hand, and the subject (the 
res cogitans) on the other. This radically abstracted the human subject out of 
nature, which became, by the same token, a pure object. As Descartes wrote 
in the Discours de la méthode, the cogito exists in itself: “(...) I knew then that I 
was a substance (...) which, in order to be, does not need any place (n’a 
besoin d'aucun lieu) (...)“.  
As one of the articles notes (Fu, pp. 306), it may indeed be contested that 
modern dualism ever existed, as Bruno Latour did in his controversial Nous 
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n’avons jamais été modernes (We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). To 
my mind, such arguments amount to confusing what Plato distinguished, 
an ideal paradigm on the one hand, and actual practice on the other. This 
distinction is precisely what, much later, made the scientific revolution 
possible; and this is because paradigms are that which leads practice into a 
certain historical direction. That is also what happened with modern dua-
lism as a paradigm: it has entailed such historical phenomena as the indus-
trial revolution, although no modern scientist, might he be Galileo or New-
ton, ever realized in his practice the cogito’s ideal abstraction. Newton in his 
practice as a historical person never transcended the contingencies of con-
crete space (which is heterogeneous, anisotropic and limited by a horizon), 
although his physics postulates an absolute, homogeneous, isotropic and 
infinite space. It may then be that Newton was not modern, but the princi-
ples of his cosmology indeed were, and that is what historically proved to 
be important. It later entailed, for example, the abstraction of “universal 
space“ in architecture. 
Both absolute space and time presuppose dualism. Without this condi-
tion, both remain related to human existence. Dualism in its turn logically 
presupposes the law of the excluded middle: either the subject (A) or the 
object (non-A), but no intermediate entity, which would be both A and 
non-A. Western logic, from Aristotle to Hegel and beyond until Lupasco, 
has clung to this law (Hegel’s synthesis overcomes the contradiction of the 
thesis and the antithesis, it does not make them coexist). Several chapters in 
Concepts of Nature deal with Aristotle, but none with this question. Yet, it is 
a decisive one, because the law of the excluded middle did not only entail 
dualism; it forcludes (rules out) symbolicity, a symbol being precisely that 
which makes A and non-A coexist in one and the same thing. This forclu-
sion of symbolicity has been inherent to Western rationalism at least since 
Plato’s Republic, from which the poets—in other words mythical thought—
are banned because “reason made that a duty for us“ (ho gar logos hêmas 
hêrei, I, VIII, 609 b 3). 
In China, contrary to Europe, the most elaborate form of logic—that of 
Buddhism—not only did not exclude the middle, it explicitly included it in 
the form of the Nagarjunian tetralemma: 1) affirmation (A); 2) negation 
(non-A); 3) neither affirmation nor negation (neither A nor non-A); 4) both 
affirmation and negation (both A and non-A). Particularly in Zen (Chan) 
Buddhism, this form of logic is also known, in Suzuki Daisetz’s 鈴木大拙 
terms, as the “logic of sokuhi“ (sokuhi no ronri 即非の論理). This may sound 
exotic, but it is in fact the very logic of symbolicity. Indeed, what the fourth 
lemma expresses is nothing other than what a symbol concretely embodies: 
the principle of the included middle, at the same time A and non-A.  
170                                                                                                  EASTM 35 (2012) 
 
Now, since a human is zôon logon echôn (a living being who possesses 
language), the human world is necessarily fraught with symbolicity. That is 
what the Greeks called kosmos, the Romans mundus, and the Chinese yuzhou 
宇宙. Conversely, what the law of the excluded middle and its forclusion of 
symbolicity eventually entailed, in the form of modern dualism and 
mechanicism, is a universe alien to human existence—that universe about 
which Pascal wrote “the eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me 
(le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie)“. And the reason why this 
universe, born from the scientific revolution, never appeared in China until 
brought in from the industrialized West, is fundamentally that Chinese rea-
son did not ban poets and symbols. 
There is not much about Buddhism in Concepts of Nature, and nothing 
about tetralemmas. To be sure, there are some discussions about logic, 
especially in Dux’ article, which puts forward, concerning China, a “sub-
jectivistic logic“. However, this article remains ambiguous about what the 
word “subject“ actually means. A subject in logic (S: zhuti 主題 or zhuyu 主
語) is opposed to a predicate (P: shuyu 述語); it is not opposed to an object 
(O: keti 客體 or duixiang 對象). On the contrary, what for the logician is the 
subject is precisely that which for the physicist is the object, i.e. that which 
the problem is about. Dux does not make this distinction, nor is he con-
cerned with predicates. Now, reality, be it in the human or animal world, is 
the way a subject (in the psychological sense, i.e. a certain being) interprets 
an object (i.e. a subject in the logical sense, S) by dint of some predicate (P); 
that is, puts it within a certain category (in Aristotle’s terms, a predicate is a 
katêgorêma). In other words, S is taken as P, through the subject’s senses, 
thoughts, words or action; and reality amounts to the relation S/P. 
Aristotelian logic is based on the identity of S, in which it is linked with 
the law of the excluded middle. This is also why modern dualism could 
absolutize the subject’s consciousness (the cogito) on the one hand, and the 
object on the other: they are two different substantial S, one being A and 
the other one non-A, with their respective identities. If one follows Dux’ 
expression, this might be called an “objectivistic logic“, as opposed to the 
“subjectivistic“ Chinese one. Yet in fact, there is not much objectiveness in 
that dualistic absolutization of S; because in reality (S/P), there can exist no 
S unless taken (predicated) as some P by a certain being. A pure S is a pure 
abstraction. And it is exactly such an abstraction which the modern Wes-
tern scientific paradigm amounts to. 
In contradistinction, Chinese logic appears as a logic of concreteness, 
that of a world actually inhabited by human beings, who feel, think, speak 
and act about the objects (S) in a certain way (P), making them real things 
(S/P). This logic, out of the universe (S), makes a cosmos (S/P), which 
speaks through symbols to the person’s mind. It differs from those “eter-
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nally mute and infinite spaces“ which were born from the scientific revolu-
tion. In other words, the Chinese did not decosmize their world, as did the 
Europeans with their respective world—at least paradigmatically, entailing 
in the long run tremendous practical effects. This process is what Heideg-
ger has called Entweltlichung, “deworlding“, adding that this gave rise to 
“Natur“ (as an object). It goes without saying that the Chinese ziran 自然, 
zaohua 造化 and the like (Harbmeier’s article is particularly enlightening 
about this terminology) did not become such a “Natur“. 
As Concepts of Nature does not pay much attention to Heideggerian 
phraseology, let us put this in a more precise way. What the process of 
decosmization means is that modern dualism has, at least in principle, 
reduced our ambient world or milieu (Umwelt, in Uexküll’s vocabulary) to 
an objective environment (or Umgebung). At about the same time when 
Uexküll, dealing in Germany with animals in general, established this 
essential distinction between Umgebung (which exists only for the scientist) 
and Umwelt (which is reality for any living being, and is always specific to 
that being, e.g. proper to a certain animal species), Watsuji, in Japan, estab-
lished a strictly homologous distinction between shizen kankyō 自然環境 
(the natural environment, as objectified by the natural sciences) and fūdō 風
土, i.e. the milieu proper to a given society.  
Here and there, in Concepts of Nature, one can catch a glimpse of that 
essential difference between environment and milieu, or Umgebung and 
Umwelt; but it is not systematized, nor even explicitly addressed.  For 
example, Kubin is perfectly right when he writes (p. 522), “I do not 
differentiate between nature and landscape in the Chinese context“. By the 
way, he might have added that one should not differentiate between nature 
and fengshui (a topic not addressed by the book, though eminently distinc-
tive of the Chinese conception of the natural environment). This means, in 
fact, that in China, the environment was not reduced to the Umgebung; it 
remained a milieu (an Umwelt). Or, to put it logically, reality remained a 
concrete S/P, it was not decomposed into two dualistic abstractions, A (a 
certain S, in this case the res cogitans) and non-A (another S, in this case the 
res extensa), forcluding (ruling out) the fact that human existence necessa-
rily predicates the environment (S) into a milieu (S/P), and that reducing 
S/P to S (i.e. the milieu to an objective Umgebung) amounts not only to 
decosmize, but to dehumanize the environment. 
If I have insisted here on these logical and ontological aspects of the 
question of nature, it is, needless to say, because I should have liked the 
book to have established more firmly these general and structuring aspects 
of the human relationship with the environment. Be that as it may, Concepts 
of Nature is an extremely rich source of detailed information, enabling one 
to elaborate that very problematic in its historical actualization. After 
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reading the book, one has plenty of concrete illustrations at one’s disposal, 
showing the respective merits and demerits of keeping nature as an 
appropriate cosmos, or of changing it into an alien, indifferent universe. In 
that sense, Concepts of Nature, though ending before the industrial revo-
lution, has much to teach us about our present environmental crisis, and 
gives us many hints about the ways to overcome it. 
